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A "Dutch Uncle" Talk on Foreign Trade 
by Murray L. Weidenbaum 
Baseball is traditionally the national pas-
time, but in Washington in recent months, the 
most popular activity seems to be "Japan 
bashing." As the U.S. trade deficit heads for an 
all-time high, senators and representatives are 
tripping over themselves to blame the Japa-
nese for this country's trade woes. 
Nor is this scapegoating limited to the 
nation's capital. Some of my conversations 
with business and labor leaders whose com-
panies are hard hit by imports remind me of 
the gripes of students who cut class, do not do 
the homework, and then complain when you 
give them a low grade. Unfortunately, the 
parallel is very appropriate; so much so, that 
our political and business leaders could benefit 
from the same type of response that I give those 
students-namely, a friendly "dutch uncle" 
talk. 
The absenteeism rate in key U.S. industries 
hit by imports is several times that of Japan. 
Our labor turnover rate is much higher. Our 
quality is often poorer-for example, as 
measured by U.S. products' failure to meet 
minimum standards of production. 
One large U.S. company that is losing its 
share of world markets still has to pay a bonus 
each time a worker puts in a full week. That is 
like my having to give an apple to each student 
who shows up for class on time. The sad truth 
is that many industries in the United States 
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still match low productivity with rising labor 
costs. We cannot blame that problem on 
foreigners. 
Erecting additional trade barriers is not the 
answer. I said additional because our hands are 
certainly not clean when it comes to open trade. 
We have erected our share of obstacles to 
imports. We may have convenient memories. 
But I speak from my own government experi-
ence when I assure you that foreign business 
executives can cite chapter and verse on U.S. 
trade restrictions. 
Even if Japan did not trade with the United 
States at all, we would still be suffering 
record-setting trade deficits . .. We must 
be doing something basically wrong. 
Despite the lip service that is so often paid 
to the virtues of free trade, there is great danger 
that the United States is taking the lead in the 
new rush toward protectionism. Public policy 
debates are now dominated by one-sided, self-
serving views of international trade. Everyone 
wants open markets and free trade overseas. We 
all know how urgent it is to eliminate foreign 
barriers to our exports. But we rarely even 
acknowledge United States' barriers to foreign 
exports. 
The tendency to focus on Japan as the source 
of our foreign trade problems is growing. It is 
true that Japan maintains an intricate variety 
of obstacles to imports that compete with its 
own products-and its government only 
reduces those obstacles in response to constant 
pressure from the U.S. Furthermore, our trade 
deficit with J apan-$33 billion last year-is far 
greater than that with any other country. In 
fact, trade with Japan accounted for nearly one-
third of our entire merchandise deficit in 1984. 
Yet we must face the fact that, even if Japan 
did not trade with the United States at all, 
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we would still be suffering a painful and his-
torically high excess of imports over exports. 
Without Japan, our total 1984 trade deficit 
would have been $69 billion-$11 billion 
more than the previous year's record-breaking 
performance. 
Let me cite just a few other examples of our 
country's trade relationships. Our traditional 
export surplus with Western Europe has turned 
into a trade deficit ($13 billion in 1984). Our 
trade accounts with Canada and Mexico are 
also in the red-$20 billion and $6 billion 
respectively last year. In fact, the United States 
has a trade deficit with almost every nation in 
the non-Communist world and has had such 
deficits for some years. 
Hence, it is silly to keep saying that everyone 
is out of step except us. We in the United States 
must be doing something basically wrong. If we 
are going to bring our imports and exports into 
balance, we need to reexamine our country's 
foreign trade and other economic policies, 
avoiding any preconceptions. 
U.S. Barriers to Imports 
It would help to clear the air if we would 
acknowledge that not all of our actions are on 
the side of the angels. We have created many 
obstacles to inhibit imports into the United 
States. Let us examine a few. 
"Buy American" statutes give preference to 
domestic producers in federal, state, and local 
government procurement. By law, most pur-
chases under the program of aid to mass transit 
must use American materials and products. 
Also, American flag vessels must be used to 
ship at least one-half of the gross tonnage of all 
commodities financed with U.S. foreign aid 
money. 
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The Federal Government's Jones Act is the 
opposite of keeping up with the Joneses. It 
prohibits foreign ships from engaging in com-
merce between American ports. This law effec-
tively bars competition in U.S. domestic marine 
transport. The perverse effects of such laws are 
much greater than you might expect. Because 
domestic timber from Oregon that is sold in 
Southern California must be shipped in high-
cost U.S. vessels, at times Canadian lumber 
transported by Japanese flag vessels has under-
sold domestic timber in that major west coast 
market. In such cases, both the American mer-
chant marine and the American timber indus-
try suffer damage. Foreigners then become the 
unintended beneficiaries of these backfiring 
attempts to subsidize the American merchant 
marine. 
Various agricultural laws limit imports of 
products such as sugar, beef, dairy produce, 
and mandarin oranges. Other laws and interna-
tional agreements limit the amount of steel and 
textiles that can come into our country. From 
time to time, we have imposed quotas on shoes 
and autos. The restriction on Japanese cars was 
informal, but no less binding. 
We all know that our average tariff rates are 
low. Yes, they are almost as low as Japan's. Of 
course, we do levy high tariffs on some items. 
Tariffs on textiles average 20 percent. Duties on 
fruit juices are over 27 percent-even clothes-
pins are hit with a 17 percent levy. As a matter 
of fact, the proportion of imports covered by 
tariffs is growing. In 1950, the United States 
allowed 54 percent of all imports to enter duty-
free. Despite all of our talk about being the only 
country that practices free trade, by 1981 only 
30 percent of our imports were allowed in with-
out paying a tariff. 
Moreover, numerous non tariff barriers, often 
of a regulatory nature, are imposed by federal, 
state, county, and municipal governments. 
Local building codes are a popular device to 
keep out foreign competitors. 
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U.S. Barriers to Exports 
We must also acknowledge the great extent 
to which our government has erected obstacles 
to our own exports. These are self-inflicted 
wounds. It makes us a laughing stock overseas 
when we urge other countries to lower their 
barriers to our exports while we ourselves 
make it more difficult for our exporters. 
Approximately 10 percent of our exports is now 
subject to these types of barriers. 
Numerous domestic statutes and regulations 
limit our exports. One law prohibits the export 
of oil from North Slope fields in Alaska. 
Another bans timber exports from federal 
lands west of the lOOth meridian. When restric-
tions get that specific, you can detect the rich 
aroma of special interest pressures. 
Export controls call into question the 
reliability of the United States as a supplier. 
In addition, the Export Administration Act 
provides for controls on exports of goods and 
technology to protect national security. That 
sounds fine. But, in practice, the law mandates 
controls over a great variety of products, 
including unprocessed red cedar and-my 
favorite-horses exported by sea. 
In 1980 the Export Administration Act was 
employed to embargo grain shipments to the 
Soviet Union. It was invoked again in 1981 and 
1982 to carry out the ban against U.S. firms par-
ticipating in the construction of the natural-gas 
pipeline between the U.S.S.R. and Western 
Europe. 
Furthermore, export controls do more than 
limit U.S. international trade for the time they 
are imposed. These restrictions also call into 
question the reliability of the United States as 
a supplier of products to other countries, which 
therefore are likely to develop alternative 
sources. 
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A clear example is soybeans-hardly a 
strategic item. The purpose of the 1974 
embargo of soybean exports was merely to con-
tain a short term increase in domestic prices. 
However, the main effect of the embargo was 
to induce Japan to turn to other producing 
countries, particularly Brazil. Japan proceeded 
to invest in that country to develop alternatives 
to U.S. production, thus effectively and per-
manently reducing our share of the world soy-
bean market. 
The United States also conducts a great vari-
ety of domestic regulatory activities that im-
pose costly burdens on American manufac-
turers. In many cases, foreign producers are not 
subject to similar burdens in their home coun-
try. For example, a comparison of U.S. envi-
ronmental regulatory policy with that of the 
United Kingdom concluded that our govern-
ment's approach has been relatively insensitive 
to the objectives and unresponsive to the objec-
tions of private enterprise, and that our regu-
latory regime is "more coercive than in any 
other industrial democracy." 
In addition to the effects of trade policies 
themselves, the strong foreign exchange value 
of the dollar makes it extremely difficult for 
American companies to compete in world 
markets. Many factors influence the strength of 
a nation's currency. But our extraordinarily 
high real interest rates are very important. In 
turn, the large budget deficits are a key influ-
ence on those rates-and we cannot blame the 
deficits on "foreign devils:· They have a made-
in-America label. 
By no means is the United States the only 
nation with trade barriers. Every nation has 
them and they continue to grow. However, the 
concerns of both our manufacturers and the 
consuming public will be far better served by 
responding to the underlying problems that 
generate pressures for protectionism. The 
answer surely is not to retaliate and thus open 
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the way for a return to the trade wars of the 
1930s which exacerbated the Great Depression. 
The Pressures for Protectionism 
How should we respond to the foreign trade 
challenge? The first step is to understand why 
protectionism is popular. It is a means by which 
small, well-organized groups use the political 
process to their advantage. The benefits are 
received by the protected industries, while 
some costs are shifted to other companies who 
buy from the protected industries. Ultimately, 
most of the costs are borne by consumers in the 
form of higher prices. Thus, protectionism can 
be viewed as a hidden tax on the consumer. A 
study at our Center for the Study of American 
Business at Washington University estimated 
that hidden tax. In 1980, it came to more than 
$58 billion or $255 for each American 
consumer. 
Like so many sales taxes, those born of pro-
tectionism are unfair. For example, "voluntary" 
quotas on imports of footwear served as a 
regressive tax whereby low-income consumers 
were harder hit than high-income consumers. 
The Reagan Administration eliminated these 
footwear quotas in 1981, but pressure now 
mounts to restore them. 
It is fascinating to note that the consumer 
stake in free trade is as striking in Japan as in 
the United States. The following is a letter to the 
editor of the Mainichi Daily News written by a 
Tokyo housewife: 
Many of us city wives are now fed up with hav-
ing to pay as much as 500 yen to 700 yen for 100 
grams of beef because the government keeps 
restrictions on its import. Husbands are asked to 
buy beef for omiyage (souvenirs) at American or 
Australian airports on their way home to bring 
back to their families because beef is much 
cheaper in those countries. Oranges and grape-
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fruit can also be much cheaper if only our govern-
ment liberalizes its imports. 
The government says it cannot lift the restric-
tions because the Japanese farmers should be pro-
tected. But the Japanese farmers are now the most 
privileged people. They are paying much less tax 
than salaried people in the cities. Some of them 
are even paid for not growing rice in their paddy 
fields. The farmers are much better off in politics 
because rural senkyo-ku (constituencies) elect 
more Diet members than city senkyo-ku per 
population. Sometimes a city Diet member repre-
sents four times as many electors as a rural MP. 
I cannot but suspect that politicians and offi-
cials are not so patriotic as they claim, and they 
seek their own good by spoiling our farmers. 
Politicians can retain their seats in the parliament 
and get political funds from the farmers' organiza-
tions. Bureaucrats can keep key posts in corpora-
tions and other bodies which control the import 
regulations for their own post-retirement jobs. 
Why should we city people support these farmers 
(and politicans and bureaucrats) by paying much 
more for beef and oranges (and rice, too) than in 
other countries? 
Protectionist measures are a two-edged 
sword. They may reduce imports from abroad, 
such as the "successful" effort by the United 
States in getting the Common Market to restrict 
its exports of steel to us. But our domestic 
automobile industry, a major purchaser of 
steel, bears the burden of higher costs, which 
in turn makes it less competitive. The net effect 
is added pressure for more protection. 
We have another example in the textile sec-
tor. In 1983, domestic producers succeeded in 
getting the Federal Government to establish 
quotas on imports of textile products from 
China. By the way, the Chinese must have 
wondered about those "inscrutable" Occiden-
tals, because we have enjoyed a large and ris-
ing trade surplus with them. How are they 
going to be able to continue being a major 
customer of American farm products if we do 
not buy their goods? 
In any event, the Chinese reacted to our pro-
tectionist policy by reducing their imports of 
agricultural and chemical products from this 
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country. Once again, the benefits of protection 
were gained by one special sector of the 
economy and the burden was felt by innocent 
bystanders. 
In the protectionist game, there are always 
winners and losers . .. The main losers are 
invariably the consumers in the country 
raising barriers to imports. 
In the protectionist game, there are always 
winners and losers. Although the list of winners 
changes, the main losers are invariably the con-
sumers in the country raising barriers to 
imports. Thus, it was the American consumer 
and not the Japanese producer who bore the 
costs of quotas on imports of Japanese 
automobiles in the early 1980s. As "visionary" 
economists warned "practical" businessmen, 
Japanese auto producers responded to the so-
called voluntary agreement to limit their sales 
of motor vehicles in the United States by 
exporting their more expensive models and 
loading them with profitable extras. Japanese 
producers achieved record profits from their 
sales of automobiles in the United States dur-
ing the period of the import restraint. While 
they exported about 30 percent of their auto 
production to this country, they earned approx-
imately one-half of their profits from U.S. sales. 
Moreover, the dealers for Toyota, Nissan, etc., 
benefited from the willingness of American 
buyers to pay substantially more than the 
sticker price (up to $2,000) in order to obtain the 
then relatively scarce Japanese product. The 
American auto buyers paid about $5 billion a 
year more for cars than would have been the 
case in the absence of the import restraints. 
When we stop to think about it, that is the result 
you would expect. Reducing the supply without 
changing demand results in higher prices. 
Unfortunately, $5 billion is a high price to pay 
for economic illiteracy on the part of govern-
ment policymakers. 
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The Case for Free Trade 
We must focus once again on economic fun-
damentals. In the immortal words of Adam 
Smith: 
It is the maxim of every prudent ... family, 
never to attempt to make at home what it will 
cost ... more to make than to buy. The tailor does 
not attempt to make his own shoes, but buys them 
of the shoemaker ... What is prudence in the con-
duct of every private family can scarcely be folly 
in that of a great kingdom. 
The arguments in favor of free trade and 
against protectionism are supported by a great 
deal of historical evidence. During the 1930s, 
the United States and many other countries 
followed "beggar-thy-neighbor" trade policies 
which contributed to the worldwide depres-
sion. The Smoot-Hawley protectionist tariff 
epitomized this approach in the United States. 
Unfortunately, memories are short. Some of 
our young people think that Smoot-Hawley is 
a British rock group. 
Subsequent to the disastrous protectionism 
of the depression period, our trade policy 
shifted to the negotiation of reciprocal trade 
agreements. These tariff reductions were 
followed by an acceleration in world trade and 
economic growth. That was not just coin-
cidence. The United States had similar experi-
ences in the nineteenth century, as did other 
countries at other times. 
Let us recapitulate the benefits of freer trade: 
• Open trade contributes to lowering inflationary 
pressures by increasing the supply of goods and 
services competing for the consumer's dollar. 
Thus, the question of free trade is basically a 
consumer issue. 
• Open trade minimizes the role of government in 
influencing private-sector decisions, thus allow-
ing individuals and business firms to respond 
to the needs and pressures of the international 
marketplace. Free trade is key to promoting 
economic freedom and the private enterprise 
system. 
• Open trade improves the efficiency with which 
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our own resources are allocated. It thereby 
yields more growth, higher levels of employ-
ment, and an improved living standard here at 
home. 
Positive Approaches to Foreign Trade Policy 
Our large trade deficit did not develop over-
night, and no panacea will cure the problem 
quickly. However, there are five sets of actions 
that will help to restore the competitiveness of 
American business, at home and abroad. 
1. Reduce the Budget Deficit 
There are two extreme positions on this issue, 
both of which I reject. One polar alternative 
blames the trade deficit entirely on the budget 
deficit, while the other absolves it completely. 
Although the linkages are complex and indi-
rect, I do believe that financing a string of $200 
billion deficits has pushed up real interest rates 
very substantially, and that has attracted large 
amounts of foreign capital to help finance the 
deficits. That substantial inflow of foreign 
money has increased the demand for dollars 
and, in turn, has resulted in a major apprecia-
tion of the dollar. The high relative value of the 
dollar has made it easier for foreign companies 
to compete against American companies, both 
in our home markets and overseas. 
Moreover, reducing the budget deficit is 
inherently desirable for purely domestic 
reasons. The trend during the 1980s thus far 
has been for federal spending to be a rising 
share of the GNP. That trend should be re-
versed. I view deficit reduction as essentially 
a task of expenditure control rather than 
"revenue enhancement." Given the many low-
yield programs that remain embedded in the 
federal budget, there is ample opportunity to 
make progress on reducing federal spending. 
2. Gear Tax Reform to Enhance Productivity 
and Competitiveness 
It is sad to note that most tax reform pro-
posals to date ignore the repercussions on 
international trade. Many of the industries 
hardest hit by imports are precisely those 
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whose tax burdens would rise the most under 
the modified flat tax proposals submitted 
both by members of Congress and the 
Administration. 
Tax reform is inherently desirable, but it is 
not now the highest priority economic issue. 
This is simply not the time to elevate the 
development of an ideal tax system to the top 
of the roster of public issues. Rather, tax policy 
needs to continue emphasizing incentives for 
the items important to enhancing our interna-
tional competitiveness-saving, investment, 
and research and development. 
In pursuing the careful and time-consuming 
task of rewriting the Internal Revenue Code, we 
should learn from the experiences of the past. 
Narrowly-focused tax preferences geared to 
one industry or region are ineffective ways of 
using the tax structure. Such special-interest 
legislation should be avoided. The government 
is not good at picking "winners;' particularly 
since the political power of old, declining sec-
tors of the economy is usually greater than that 
of new, developing sectors of the economy. 
What is needed are broad-based incentives 
aimed at encouraging saving and investment 
generally. 
3. Renew the Regulatory Reform Effort 
The costs of producing goods and services in 
the United States can be reduced by launching 
another effort to reform government regulation 
of business. The elimination of some economic 
regulation has reduced the cost of transporta-
tion. This is not, however, a reason to dismantle 
social regulation. But closer attention to the 
tremendous costs imposed by EPA, OSHA, and 
other regulatory agencies would help to restore 
industrial competitiveness. All regulations 
should be subject to a tough benefit-cost test 
before they are issued. 
4. Reduce U.S. Barriers to U.S. Exports 
About one-half of our trade deficit with 
Japan could be reduced if Congress rescinded 
the bans on the exports of timber and oil. 
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Restraints on the export of strategic goods 
should be administered with common sense. It 
does not contribute to national security to pre-
vent American companies from selling overseas 
items that are readily available from foreign 
competitors. We must supplement efforts to 
reduce our own trade barriers by continuing to 
pressure other nations to open their markets to 
our products and services. Japan is off to a late 
start in this regard, but its government now 
seems to be making a genuine effort to reduce 
trade barriers. 
5. American Business and Labor Must Face the 
Challenge of Increasing Productivity 
We cannot blame our poor production prac-
tices on foreigners. The answer is not to prop 
up industries with import restrictions or 
government subsidies-or to play King Canute 
and try to prevent businesses by law from clos-
ing down or "running away." Rather, labor and 
management in each company need to face the 
challenge of enhancing their competitiveness. 
Management must show the way. Cutting 
back on the proliferation of staff activities and 
layers of executives creates an operating envi-
ronment in which labor is more likely to accept 
changes in needlessly costly factory work rules. 
Protectionism is counterproductive since it 
lessens the pressure on management and labor 
to make the painful but necessary changes that 
enhance productivity. We all must acknowledge 
the painful fact that foreign competition is the 
most effective spur to greater productivity. 
On occasion, albeit reluctantly, the necessary 
changes are being made. In both Weirton, West 
Virginia, and Johnstown, Pennsylvania, unprof-
itable steel plants were sold to the employees. 
What were the results? Faced with economic 
disaster and unemployment, tough decisions 
were finally made. 
Wages and benefits-which were approx-
imately 90 percent above the average for factory 
workers-were brought closer to competitive 
reality. Layers of management were eliminated. 
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Work rules were streamlined. Both plants are 
now operating in the black, despite the strong 
dollar and powerful foreign competition. Iron-
ically, if the mutual suspicion of labor and 
management had been eliminated earlier, the 
changes needed to restore competitiveness 
could have been made under the original own-
ership and with much less disruption. 
None of these five points is easy to carry out. 
But each represents a constructive response to 
our trade problems, and a far more eco-
nomically sound approach than a burst of 
protectionism. 
The pressures for "protecting" American pro-
ducts against foreign competition are rising. 
We as a nation can throw in the towel and erect 
more barriers to imports. But we know that do-
ing so will not increase the competitiveness of 
our companies, that the consumer will wind up 
paying the bill, and that innocent industries 
will be hit by the inevitable retaliation of our 
trading partners. 
Nor, I must admit, is the answer merely 
another sermon on the virtues of free trade. 
After all, a competitive world is a tough 
environment for business to operate in. But the 
more productive that our businesses become-
and the lower their costs-the more com-
petitive they will be. Thus, the future of 
American industry depends on decision-
makers, in both the public and private sectors, 
supporting at least some version of the five-
point program presented here. The longer they 
wait, the more American companies will have 
to play catch-up ball. 
Fundamentally, the future of American 
industry will not be settled by government 
directives from Tokyo or Washington-but by 
decisions made in business offices and on pro-
duction floors in Boston, Detroit, Chicago, Pitts-
burgh, Los Angeles, St. Louis, and other major 
cities throughout the nation. 
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